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OBJECTOR BLACKMAIL UPDATE:  WHAT HAVE 
THE 2018 AMENDMENTS DONE? 
Brian T. Fitzpatrick* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, I, along with Brian Wolfman and Alan Morrison, wrote a letter to 
the Federal Advisory Committee for the Rules of Appellate Procedure asking 
them to adopt a new rule to prohibit class members who file objections from 
dismissing their appeals in exchange for side settlements from class counsel.1  
Our letter was based on my 2009 article, The End of Objector Blackmail?,2 
where I argued that no good comes from these side settlements.3  Either the 
objection has no merit and the side settlement therefore encourages more 
frivolous objections filed to hold up more settlements to extract more side 
settlements (i.e., “objector blackmail”) or the objection has merit, but by 
resolving it on the side and not changing the class settlement, other class 
members were deprived of the benefit of the objection.4  We argued that a 
flat prohibition on side settlements should reduce the number of appeals filed 
from class settlements and fee awards because the blackmail-minded 
objectors would stop bothering with objections if they knew they could not 
profit from them.5 
Our letter was referred to the Federal Advisory Committee for the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and it inspired the adoption of the new Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(e)(5)(B), which became effective in December 
2018.6  The new rule does not go as far as our letter recommended:  it does 
not prohibit side payments but, instead, allows side payments if the district 
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School.  This Essay was prepared for the Symposium entitled Securities and Consumer 
Litigation—Pathways and Hurdles, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Institute for 
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grateful to Ryli Wallace for research assistance as well as to the participants at this Symposium 
for their helpful feedback on a draft of this Essay. 
 
 1. Letter from Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, to the 
Honorable Jeffery S. Sutton, Chair, Advisory Comm. on App. Rules (Aug. 22, 2012) 
[hereinafter Letter to Sutton],  https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/12-AP-
F-suggestion.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BBX-C6D5]. 
 2. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623 (2009). 
 3. See Letter to Sutton, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 4. Id. at 4. 
 5. Id. 
 6. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(B). 
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court that approved the class settlement also approves the side payment.7  I 
was skeptical when the new rule was adopted that it would mitigate objector 
blackmail.  But now that we have had over one full year of experience with 
the new rule, we can take a look to see what the new rule has actually done.  
In this Essay, I attempt to do just that. 
In Part I of this Essay, I describe the problem of objector blackmail, why 
prohibiting side payments to objectors would be the best way to screen 
blackmail-minded objections from other objections, and why I did not think 
the new FRCP 23(e)(5)(B) would do so as effectively.  In Part II, I examine 
what district courts have done with their new side payment approval authority 
over the first sixteen months.  I found six orders by district courts on whether 
to approve side payments:  four approvals and two denials.  Although this is 
not much data, qualitative review of the orders does not inspire confidence 
that district court judges will have the requisite backbone to reject blackmail-
minded side payments.  On the other hand, the approved side payments may 
be less lucrative under the new rule.  In Part III, I try to assess how these two 
contrary forces might weigh against each other by studying empirically 
whether the new rule has discouraged class action objectors from taking 
appeals.  Although my methods are crude, they suggest there has been no 
slowdown in these appeals in the first year of the new rule. 
I.  OBJECTOR BLACKMAIL:  PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS 
Class members who object to class action settlements and fee awards can 
serve a vital role in class action litigation.  Because both class counsel and 
the defendant, by definition, support class settlements, the only adversarial 
testing of settlements and fee petitions in either the district court or the court 
of appeals usually comes from objections litigated by absent class members.  
For this reason, it is important to ensure that class members who wish to 
improve settlements and trigger closer scrutiny of fee awards have the means 
and opportunity to do so through objections.8 
But we have known for many years that some class members and their 
counsel file objections not because they want to improve settlements or 
reduce fee awards but, rather, because they want to delay settlements and 
extract private benefit for themselves.9  This is what I call “objector 
blackmail.”10  Objectors can cause delay because they have the right to file 
appeals in the courts of appeals when district courts overrule their objections 
and approve class action settlements and fee awards.11  These delays impose 
costs on class members, class counsel, and the defendant.  Not only does it 
take time and money to file briefs but even frivolous appeals can significantly 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1630. 
 9. The first article on the subject was written by Edward Brunet. See generally Edward 
Brunet, Class Action Objectors:  Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 403. 
 10. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1624. 
 11. See Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 14 (2002). 
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postpone the distribution of settlements to class members, the distribution of 
fee awards to class counsel, and the finality for which the defendant has 
agreed to pay.12  These costs and delays can become so significant that it 
becomes rational for class counsel (most commonly) or the defendant to pay 
the objectors to drop their appeals.13  In essence, the law permits one class 
member to hold everything up for everyone else and, thereby, extract money 
from those affected by the delay. 
The prospect of these side deals has encouraged class members to file 
objections and appeals to collect the blackmail payments.  As a result, the 
Federal Judicial Center has long warned judges to “[w]atch out . . . for 
canned objections from professional objectors” and to “be wary of self-
interested professional objectors who often present rote objections to class 
counsel’s fee requests and add little or nothing to the fee proceedings.”14  
Many courts have also commented on the blackmail problem.15 
A number of solutions to this problem had been tried before the 2018 rule 
change, but all of them had failed.16  As I explained in my 2009 article, the 
other potential solutions—sanctions for frivolous objections and appeals, 
requiring objectors to post appellate bonds, and provisions in settlement 
agreements that accelerate the payment of fees for class counsel (so-called 
“quick pay provisions”)—are either incomplete solutions to the problem or 
create cures that are worse than the disease because they chill legitimate 
objectors as well as blackmail-minded ones (or, in some cases, only 
legitimate objectors and not blackmail-minded ones).17 
What is needed is a way to clearly separate class members who file 
objections for the purpose of improving settlements from class members who 
file objections for the purpose of collecting side deals.  The way to do this is 
through the proposal I made in my 2009 article and repeated in our 2012 
letter:  to prohibit objectors from dropping their appeals in exchange for 
something of value from class counsel or the defendant.18  With such a rule, 
 
 12. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1634. 
 13. Id. at 1634–35. 
 14. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUD. CTR., MANAGING CLASS 
ACTION LITIGATION:  A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 15, 31 (2d ed. 2009), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ClassGd2.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYH3-3P7Q]. 
 15. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 507 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 2007) (“In 
some circumstances objectors may use an appeal as a means of leveraging compensation for 
themselves or their counsel.”); Vollmer v. Publishers Clearing House, 248 F.3d 698, 709 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (noting that class members sometimes appeal “solely to enable themselves to 
receive [a] fee”); Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(noting that appeals from objections can become “extortive legal proceedings”); Barnes v. 
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 01-10395, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71072, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 
22, 2006) (noting that blackmail-minded objectors “can levy what is effectively a tax on class 
action settlements”); Snell v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., No. 97-2784, 2000 WL 1336640, at *9 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 8, 2000) (noting objectors who “maraud proposed settlements—not to assess their 
merits on some principled basis—but in order to extort the parties”); Shaw v. Toshiba Am. 
Info. Sys., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (noting “objectors who seek out class 
actions to simply extract a fee by lodging generic, unhelpful protests”). 
 16. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1651–57 (cataloguing these failed efforts). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See Letter to Sutton, supra note 1, at 4. 
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only objectors who actually care about the merits of their objections and 
appeals will file objections and appeals because their goal is to actually 
change the class settlement or fee award; objectors who are in it only for the 
side deals will no longer bother.  In short, such a rule will effectively screen 
out blackmail-minded objectors but preserve access for objectors with 
legitimate bases for an appeal.19 
It is true that a prohibition on side payments would prohibit even legitimate 
objectors with meritorious objections from dropping their appeals in 
exchange for something of value for themselves.  Although at first blush it 
might seem strange to prevent someone who has brought a meritorious appeal 
from settling it, in the special context of class action objections, private 
settlements that are kept secret and not presented to judges for approval are 
never socially beneficial in my view.  Any meritorious objection brought by 
a class member should, if vindicated, benefit not only the objector but other 
class members as well.  If an objector is permitted to settle the objection in a 
side deal, however, only the objector benefits—none of the similarly situated 
class members do.20  That is, the positive externalities to other class members 
that may have been derived from the objections and appeals are lost.21  For 
example, if an objector objects to the manner in which a settlement is 
allocated among class members, all class members who are similarly situated 
to the objector stand to benefit from the objection.  Or if an objector objects 
to the percentage of the settlement that will be paid in fees to class counsel, 
all class members stand to benefit from the lower fee percentage.  But in both 
of these examples, only the objector will benefit if the appeal is dropped in a 
side deal because the merits of the objection are never addressed.  For this 
reason, some commentators believe that private settlements with objectors 
are unethical as a general matter.22  But even if we do not go that far, nothing 
is lost—and, indeed, much gained—when even class members with 
legitimate objections cannot drop their appeals in exchange for payments 
from class counsel or the defendant. 
In 2003, in response to some of these concerns, FRCP 23(e)(5) was created 
to require district courts to approve the withdrawal of any objections to class 
action settlements.23  When this amendment was under consideration, the 
Advisory Committee considered extending it to require district court 
 
 19. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1660–61. 
 20. See, e.g., Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1148 (11th Cir. 1983) (indicating 
that similarly situated class members should be treated alike unless “rebutted by a factual 
showing that the higher allocations to certain parties are rationally based on legitimate 
considerations”). 
 21. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1663. 
 22. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without 
Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 132 (2001); see also Katherine Ikeda, Note, 
Silencing the Objectors, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 177, 203–04 (2001). 
 23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment 
(revising and restyling the rule as 23(e)(5)). 
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approval even if an objection was dropped on appeal.24  But the extension 
was dropped.25  As a result, a loophole was created:  objectors who wished 
to blackmail class counsel or the defendant simply waited for the appeal. 
In our 2012 letter, we asked the Advisory Committee to do for objector 
appeals what the old FRCP 23(e)(5) had done for objections before the 
district court:  require permission before a class member can withdraw.26  
But, in light of what we had learned about objector blackmail in the ensuing 
years, as well as what I noted above was the lack of benefit of any side 
settlement in the special context of class action objections, we further asked 
to forbid courts from granting that permission unless the objector and counsel 
for all the parties certified that they had neither given nor received anything 
of value in return.27 
It should be noted that I do not believe that class members who file 
objections should never receive any compensation that other class members 
do not.  Class members who file legitimate objections often must hire lawyers 
to do so, and, like any other counsel, these lawyers need some economic 
incentive to participate in the litigation.  As such, I believe that class members 
with legitimate objections ought to be compensated for their efforts.28  But 
when objectors are compensated, it should only be for successful objections 
that have created value for other class members, not objections that have 
failed or were never considered.  Moreover, it should only come by way of 
district court approval, not by way of a secret side deal with class counsel or 
the defendant.  Federal courts already widely recognize the authority of 
district courts under FRCP 23(h) to award objectors attorneys’ fees when 
their objections create value for the class—for example, when an objection 
causes the district court to reduce class counsel’s fee request or when an 
objection causes class counsel and the defendant to revise the terms of the 
settlement—by compensating them from the settlement proceeds or class 
counsel’s fee award.29  This is a manifestation of the same unjust enrichment 
doctrine that underlies class counsel’s own attorneys’ fees.  Nothing I 
proposed would have changed this. 
Nonetheless, the rulemakers were unwilling to go as far as we had 
recommended.  Instead, they revised FRCP 23(e)(5) in two ways.  First, they 
 
 24. See Civ. Rules Advisory Comm., Minutes of the Meeting of October 16 and 17, 2000, 
at 9, https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-
rules-civil-procedure-october-2000 [https://perma.cc/Y5KM-CELH]. 
 25. See DAVID F. LEVI, ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FED. RULES OF CIV. PROC., REPORT OF 
THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 178–84, 277 (2002), https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-may-
2002 [https://perma.cc/KZT5-S5GJ]. 
 26. Letter to Sutton, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 27. Id. at 6. 
 28. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1665; Letter to Sutton, supra note 1, at 6.  It is an 
interesting question how judges should compensate successful objectors.  Although I have not 
examined the question in detail, my intuition is that it should be done the same way we 
compensate class counsel:  pay them a percentage of the benefits they create for the class. See 
BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS 90–95 (2019). 
 29. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 658–59 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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created FRCP 23(e)(5)(A) and took away some of the district court’s 
authority over the withdrawal of objections still before the district court:  
whereas the old rule required the district court’s permission to withdraw any 
objection, the new rule requires permission only if something of value is 
exchanged.30  Second—and this was the response to our letter—they created 
FRCP 23(e)(5)(B) and gave the district court new authority over side 
payments once an appeal was filed:  “Unless approved by the court after a 
hearing, no payment or other consideration may be provided in connection 
with . . . forgoing, dismissing, or abandoning an appeal . . . .”31 
In my 2009 article, I considered a rule like FRCP 23(e)(5)(B),32 but by the 
time of our 2012 letter, I had thought better of it for two reasons.  First, as I 
noted above, if the objector has not changed the settlement or fee award for 
the rest of the class, then any legitimate concern with the settlement or fee 
award is lost by dropping the appeal.33  Why would we want to lose these 
positive externalities for other class members?  Second, I worried about the 
fortitude of our district court judges.  There has been great concern for many 
years with their scrutiny of class action settlements because it usually takes 
place in the absence of adversarial presentations, and workload reduction 
pressure makes it easy to rubber-stamp uncontested motions.34  Although the 
authority to approve side settlements granted by FRCP 23(e)(5)(B) does not 
implicate the latter concern—the workload implicated is that of the court of 
appeals rather than of the district court—the presentation of a side settlement 
to the district court will be uncontested.  If district courts rubber-stamped side 
payments, then FRCP 23(e)(5)(B) would not screen blackmail-minded 
objectors from other objectors and the tide of objector blackmail would 
continue unabated. 
At various junctures in the rulemaking process, I asked the rulemakers why 
they refused to go all the way and prohibit all side settlements.  In particular, 
I asked for an example of when an objector should be paid despite not 
improving the settlement or fee award for the class.  The only example I was 
offered was this one:  suppose the district court believed the settlement was 
reasonable, but the objector raised a plausible concern that no one else raised; 
could not the district court approve a payment to the objector for improving 
the process of the consideration of the settlement and fees, even if the 
objector did not improve the substance of the settlement or fee award?  
Although there is some merit to this idea, it is so broadly applicable—it could 
apply to nearly any objection—that, in light of the rubber-stamping fear I 
 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5)(A). 
 31. Id. r. 23(e)(5)(B).  Because the objector will want to know whether the district court 
will approve the side payment before the appeal is dismissed, the district court will usually be 
asked only to make an “indicative ruling” of what it would do with the side payment. See 
BOLCH JUD. INST., GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES:  IMPLEMENTING 2018 AMENDMENTS TO 
RULE 23 CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS 28–30 (2018), https://judicialstudies. 
duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Class-Actions-Best-Practices-Final-Version.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DHL3-L6EE]. 
 32. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1664. 
 33. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text. 
 34. Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1631 & nn.33–34. 
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described above, I worried that it had the potential to become an exception 
that would swallow the rule.  In other words, this example confirmed my 
view that FRCP 23(e)(5)(B) would be a poor vehicle to separate blackmail-
minded objectors from others. 
II.  QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRCP 23(E)(5)(B) IN PRACTICE 
Now that we have lived with the new rule for over one year, we can assess 
whether my skepticism was mistaken.  In order to do so, I looked for every 
time a district court has been asked to approve a side settlement under FRCP 
23(e)(5)(B).  As of April 2020, I found six such occasions.35  They are 
summarized in Table 1 below, where I list in chronological order the name 
of the case, how much the court awarded class counsel in fees, how much 
class counsel or the defendant wanted to pay the objector to drop the appeal, 
and whether the court approved the side payment.  The amount of the side 
payment includes all payments, whether styled as a fee to the objector’s 
attorney, an incentive payment to the objector, or, in one case, a donation to 
charity.  I include class counsel’s fee award in the table because class counsel 
usually pays side payments, and the amount that objectors can extract is, in 
theory, correlated with how much class counsel stands to gain by getting rid 
of the objector.36 
   
 
 35. See infra notes 37–42. 
 36. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 2, at 1634–35. 
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Table 1:  FRCP 23(e)(5)(B) Side Settlements Requests Through April 2020 
Case 
Class 
Counsel’s 
Fees 
Proposed 
Side 
Payment 
Side 
Payment 
Approved
? 
In re Volkswagen Timing 
Chain Products Liability 
Litigation (D.N.J.)37 
$8,500,000 Undisclosed Yes 
In re Experian Data Breach 
Litigation (C.D. Cal.)38 
$10,500,000 $10,000 Yes 
Douglas v. Western Union 
Co. (N.D. Ill.)39 
$425,000 $79,740 No 
In re Foreign Exchange 
Benchmark Rates Antitrust 
Litigation (S.D.N.Y.)40 
$300,335,750 $300,000 No 
In re Dental Supplies 
Antitrust Litigation 
(E.D.N.Y.)41 
$26,666,667 $150,000 Yes 
In re Takata Airbag 
Products Liability 
Litigation (S.D. Fla.)42 
$74,775,000 $1,906,000 
(to twelve 
objectors)
Yes 
 
 37. Order at 3, In re Volkswagen Timing Chain Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 16-cv-02765 
(D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2019), ECF No. 250 (stating that the court will grant approval of the 
settlements with the objectors upon remand of the Third Circuit but withholding the amount 
of the settlement). 
 38. Order Approving Payment to Objector Pursuant to FRCP Rule 23(e)(5)(B) at 2, In re 
Experian Data Breach Litig., No. 15-cv-01592 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2019), ECF No. 335; 
Stipulation Requesting Approval of Payment to Objector Pursuant to FRCP Rule 23(e)(5)(B), 
In re Experian, No. 15-cv-01592 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2019), ECF No. 334) (approving the 
$10,000 payment to the objector and his counsel pursuant to an agreement that the objection 
would be withdrawn and the original terms of the settlement shall remain in place for the 
remainder of the class). 
 39. Notification of Docket Entry at 1, Douglas v. W. Union Co., No. 14-cv-01741 (N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 2, 2019), ECF No. 187 (denying in part the motion for an indicative ruling approving 
the objector’s settlement under FRCP 23(e)(5)(B) after a hearing on the issue). 
 40. Opinion & Order at 1, In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., No. 13-
cv-07789 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019), ECF No. 1358 (denying the motion for an indicative 
ruling of approval for a $300,000 side payment to come from class counsel’s fees to avoid 
encouraging frivolous objections). 
 41. See Joint Motion by Plaintiffs & Objector for Indicative Ruling to Effectuate Terms 
of Settlement with Objector & Objector’s Counsel at 2–4, In re Dental Supplies Antitrust 
Litig., No. 16-cv-00696 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2019), ECF No. 344 [hereinafter Joint Motion] 
(asking the court to approve a settlement, which was granted without written opinion on 
October 17, 2019, where $100,000 of class counsel fees would be donated to the American 
Dental Association, $5000 would reimburse the objector for his participation, and $45,000 
would go to the objector’s counsel for attorney fees); see also Objector’s Unopposed Motion 
for Attorney Fees at 2–4, In re Dental Supplies, No. 16-cv-00696 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2019), 
ECF No. 345 (same). 
 42. Order of Indicative Ruling Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, at 2–3, In re 
Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 15-cv-02599-MD (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2020), ECF No. 
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As the table shows, objectors are batting 0.666, very good by baseball 
standards and not bad by objector standards:  they have had a much better 
than even chance at getting paid for making unsuccessful objections thus far 
under the new rule.  But whether this track record might discourage 
blackmail-minded objectors depends on why courts are approving and 
rejecting the payments.  What did the judges say? 
Three reasons have thus far emerged for approving the side payments.  
First, two courts noted that doing so avoided further delay in getting 
compensation to the class.43  Second, two courts noted that the objections 
helped to frame the issues for the reviewing courts.44  Third, one court noted 
that the objection had improved the settlement administration process—in 
that case, the objectors had recommended using a lottery to improve the 
percentage of class members taking advantage of the settlement, and the 
recommendation was adopted by class counsel.45 
What about the courts that rejected the side payments?  One, Judge Gary 
Feinerman, did not give any written reasons, and a transcript of the hearing 
is unavailable.46  The other, Judge Lorna G. Schofield, wrote a four-page 
opinion that said she refused to pay an objector to “avoid further delay . . . 
that the Objector . . . caused by filing the appeal” or to reward the objector 
when the court’s decision to reduce class counsel’s fee had “nothing to do 
with the Objector’s objection,” even though “the Court’s fee award 
minimally correlates with the premise of the objection” (i.e., that the 
requested fee was too high).47  In short, “[a]pproving agreements in these 
circumstances would serve only to encourage objectors or their attorneys to 
extract this type of payment, and ‘make a living [as serial objectors] simply 
by filing frivolous appeals and thereby slowing down the execution of 
settlements.’”48 
What can we make of these decisions?  To begin with, it is clear to me that 
the courts that approved side settlements because they avoided delay in 
 
3632 (awarding the settlement fee of $1,906,000 to the twelve objectors based on their 
agreement with class counsel to use $5 million of the settlement for a sweepstakes program, 
beneficial to the entire class). 
 43. Order, supra note 37, at 2–3 (noting that the court would grant approval because 
“14,635 claims have been filed by Class Members but distribution of approved settlement 
funds is delayed until the Objectors/Appellants’ appeals are resolved”); Joint Motion, supra 
note 41, at 4 (“[A]pproving these payments will allow the settlement funds to be distributed 
without further delays arising from adjudicating the Objector’s appeal.”). 
 44. Joint Motion, supra note 41, at 3 (“Class Counsel agree that the objection assisted in 
framing the issues for consideration by the Court in connection with its approval of the Class 
Settlement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).”); Order Approving Payment to Objector Pursuant to 
FRCP Rule 23(e)(5)(B), supra note 38, at 2 (accepting the reasoning in the stipulation, which 
stated, “the Parties agree that the Objection assisted in framing the issues for consideration by 
the Court in connection with settlement approval under Fed. Rule Civ. Pro. 23(e)”). 
 45. Order of Indicative Ruling Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, supra note 
42, at 2–3. 
 46. See generally Notification of Docket Entry, supra note 39. 
 47. Opinion & Order, supra note 40, at 2–3. 
 48. Id. at 3 (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust 
Litig., 178 F. Supp. 3d 635, 639 (N.D. Ohio 2016)). 
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getting money to the class made a mistake.  As Judge Schofield noted, the 
only reason there is a delay is because the objector filed the appeal!  Paying 
the objector to avoid delay created by the objector is akin to paying a bank 
robber to give money it robbed back to the bank.  That is a recipe for more 
robberies, not fewer.  This is why the “best practices” promulgated by the 
Bolch Judicial Institute at Duke Law School in the wake of the rule say that 
“a court may not consider as a benefit to the class members the time that 
would otherwise be spent addressing the withdrawn objection or appeal . . . .  
Otherwise, every improper objection would be subject to compensation on 
these grounds.”49 
Second, I remain skeptical of the courts that approved side settlements 
because the objectors helped frame the issues—the reason cited to me by the 
rulemakers when I challenged the new rule while it was still a proposal.  I 
have examined the objections in both of these cases, and they are no different 
from nearly every other objection I have seen filed in class action cases.  As 
I feared, I believe this justification for side payments has the potential to 
become an exception that swallows the rule in the hands of judges who can 
be too prone to rubber-stamp uncontested motions.  In my opinion, Judges 
Feinerman and Schofield deserve kudos for resisting the temptation to go 
along with such entreaties.50 
The only justification for approving a side settlement that has any 
resonance with me is Judge Federico A. Moreno’s order in In re Takata:  
improving the settlement administration process.51  When I proposed my rule 
uniformly prohibiting side payments, I had not anticipated that an objector 
might create value for the class without changing the settlement agreement 
itself.  But it is true that improving the distribution process is one way that 
can occur.  Thus, of the four approved side payments, this one may be the 
only one where I agree the objector might have deserved to be paid.  But it is 
important to note that nothing prevents an objector that improves settlement 
administration from seeking an unjust enrichment fee award in the normal 
course under FRCP 23(h) in the same way an objector could for improving 
the settlement itself.  That is, there is no need to hold up the settlements and 
fees by taking appeals in order to improve the settlement administration 
process and get paid for it.  In my view, judges should channel such objectors 
to the normal process of FRCP 23(h), instead of encouraging them to create 
undue leverage over class counsel by holding things up on appeal and then 
seeking payment under FRCP 23(e)(5)(B). 
In sum, based on the first year of experience under FRCP 23(e)(5)(B), I 
am still skeptical that the rule will have much effect on objector blackmail.  I 
suspect blackmail-minded objectors will continue freely filing their 
objections and appeals until they run into judges like Judges Feinerman and 
Schofield, and then they will stop filing their objections in those courts and 
 
 49. BOLCH JUD. INST., supra note 31, at 25. 
 50. See Notification of Docket Entry, supra note 39; Opinion & Order, supra note 40. 
 51. See Order of Indicative Ruling Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, supra 
note 42, at 2–3. 
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those courts only; they will continue freely filing in the courts that approve 
side payments or have yet to confront one. 
Nonetheless, there may be one way in which the new rule has mitigated 
the threat of objector blackmail.  In the three cases where side payments were 
approved and the amounts of the side payments were disclosed, we can see 
that the payments were closely tied to the objector’s counsel’s lodestar (in 
addition to reimbursement of travel expenses and small incentive payments 
to the objectors themselves).52  In other words, the side payments do not 
appear to be a function of class counsel’s fee award.  This should make 
objector blackmail much less lucrative.  If so, the new rule could discourage 
blackmail-minded objections by making them less profitable even if not less 
successful. 
III.  DOES FRCP 23(E)(5)(B) DISCOURAGE BLACKMAIL-MINDED 
OBJECTIONS? 
As I noted in Part II, there are reasons to be both skeptical and hopeful that 
FRCP 23(e)(5)(B) may discourage blackmail-minded objections.  On the 
skeptical side, most judges have been lax in approving side payments.  On 
the hopeful side, the amount of the side payments may have been reduced to 
nothing more than reimbursement of time and expenses—not a very good 
investment for objectors when any approval of the side payment is uncertain.  
In this part, I ask whether we can test these competing hypotheses empirically 
by examining how many objectors filed appeals from class action settlements 
in the year before the new rule took effect (2018) compared to how many 
objectors did so in the year after the new rule took effect (2019).53 
As I learned from my past studies of class action settlements, it is difficult 
to conduct empirical studies in this area because there is no readily available 
list of class action settlements outside of the securities fraud area, and even 
when the settlements can be identified, the only way to learn information 
about the settlements—including whether an objector filed an appeal—is to 
examine the court dockets by hand.54  That sort of investigation here would 
have taken many months and is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
Instead, I decided to try a shortcut.  There is a commercially available 
product called Lex Machina that uses machine learning to read the docket 
sheets in the federal courts’ Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(PACER) system.  I asked the team at Lex Machina if we could query the 
system to calculate how many objectors filed appeals from class action 
settlements in 2018 compared to 2019.  Although that precise query was not 
 
 52. Id. at 3; Objector’s Unopposed Motion for Attorney Fees, supra note 41, at 3–4; 
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possible, a similar one was possible.  Lex Machina could ask how many 
“class action” cases resolved by “likely settlement:  stipulated dismissal” 
with termination dates in 2018 or 2019 were also “appealed to circuit court.”  
This query is not precisely what we want to study here—e.g., it includes 
appeals from anyone, not only objectors, and it includes cases settled before 
class certification—but it is overinclusive in the same ways for both years.  
As such, there is no reason to believe the lack of precision will bias the 
comparative results in one direction or another.  On the other hand, it is still 
possible that the noise caused by the irrelevant cases will obscure any effect 
on the relevant cases; after all, the number of cases that objectors appeal 
appears to be low:  in prior empirical work, I found only twenty-seven 
objector appeals from federal class action settlements or fees in a given 
year.55  Even with all those caveats, the results from Lex Machina are not 
encouraging:  the program found slightly more class action cases appealed 
(120) in 2019 than in 2018 (107), despite the fact that the total number of 
class action cases with settlements went down in 2019 (2691) from 2018 
(2809). 
CONCLUSION 
I have long advocated changing the federal rules to discourage class action 
objectors from using the appellate process to extract side payments from class 
counsel and defendants.  Although the rulemakers amended FRCP 23 in 2018 
in an attempt to do this, I have been skeptical that the new rule is strong 
enough to get the job done.  In order to assess how the new rule is faring, I 
examined every district court order considering whether to approve a side 
payment since the new rule became effective, through April 2020.56  
Although this is not much data, qualitative analysis of the data does not 
inspire confidence that district court judges will have the requisite backbone 
to reject blackmail-minded side payments.  On the other hand, the side 
payments approved may have become less lucrative under the new rule.  Still, 
crude attempts to determine whether the overall effect of the new rule has 
discouraged blackmail-minded objections are not encouraging. 
What more can be done absent a stronger rule from the rules committee?  
In a remarkable decision, the Seventh Circuit recently forced objectors to 
disgorge their side payments on the grounds that the payments constituted 
unjust enrichment.57  I am not sure if this decision is right on the law, but if 
it were to become the law of the land, it would do through the common law 
what I had asked the rulemakers to do legislatively in 2012.  Although the 
decision dealt with side payments that were made before the 2018 
amendments to FRCP 23 and it might be hard to use it against side payments 
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that are blessed by a federal judge under the new rule, the decision might 
discourage objectors from seeking such side payments to begin with.58 
But we may not need judges or rules committees to stamp out objector 
blackmail; it may be something that parties to class actions can do on their 
own.  How?  By credibly precommitting to refuse to make side payments.  
For example, if class action settlements contained a “poison pill” that said 
the agreement would become void if class counsel or the defendant made a 
side payment to an objector, then objectors would know they would be unable 
to extract one of these payments in that case.  Only objectors interested in 
changing the agreement would then file objections.  I have never seen parties 
try this strategy, but it may be the best hope to eliminate this unsavory corner 
of class action practice. 
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